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Abstract
Memory conformity occurs when an individual endorses what other individuals remember about past events. Research on
memory conformity is currently dominated by a ‘forensic’ perspective, which views the phenomenon as inherently
undesirable. This is because conformity not only distorts the accuracy of an individual’s memory, but also produces false
corroboration between individuals, effects that act to undermine criminal justice systems. There is growing awareness,
however, that memory conformity may be interpreted more generally as an adaptive social behavior regulated by explicit
mentalizing mechanisms. Here, we provide novel evidence in support of this emerging alternative theoretical perspective.
We carried out a memory conformity experiment which revealed that explicit belief-simulation (i.e. using one’s own beliefs
to model what other people believe) systematically biases conformity towards like-minded individuals, even when there is
no objective evidence that they have a more accurate memory than dissimilar individuals. We suggest that this bias is
functional, i.e. adaptive, to the extent that it fosters trust, and hence cooperation, between in-group versus out-group
individuals. We conclude that memory conformity is, in more fundamental terms, a highly desirable product of explicit
mentalizing mechanisms that promote adaptive forms of social learning and cooperation.
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Introduction
Mentalizing is the ability to understand the covert mental states
that underlie one’s own and other people’s overt behavior.
According to Frith and Frith [1], mentalizing serves two adaptive
roles in social cognition. Mentalizing about another person’s
knowledge relative to one’s own can bias social learning towards
individuals offering complementary or superior knowledge, thus
enhancing the accuracy of our own representations of reality [1]
[2]. In addition, keeping track of other people’s beliefs, desires and
intentions in relation to one’s own may generate trust, foster
cooperation and promote joint endeavors, such as science, that
indirectly benefit individuals [1]. We have recently argued [3] that
the adaptive perspective on mentalizing may illuminate our
understanding of memory function in social contexts, an area of
research that is currently dominated by a ‘forensic’ perspective.
We provided evidence [3] that memory conformity is regulated by
explicit mentalizing mechanisms that promote accuracy in the
precise adaptive manner described by Frith and Frith [1]. In this
paper, we propose a further explicit mentalizing mechanism that
could functionally bias conformity in the absence of objective
evidence that one person’s memory is superior to that of another.
This proposal is tested in a novel experiment, which reveals that
simulating another person’s beliefs (i.e. using one’s own beliefs as a
model for their beliefs) biases individuals to conform to the
memory of like-minded others who are similar to one’s self.
The recent surge in research dealing with social influences upon
memory was inspired by seminal studies, beginning in the 1970s,
which examined the effect of accurate and inaccurate post-event
information on eyewitness memory (reviewed in [4]). In this
context, regardless of whether a person accepts accurate or
inaccurate information from a co-witness, the resulting corrobo-
ration between their testimonies is false and therefore undesirable.
From this forensic perspective, other people are merely the source
of highly contagious contaminants that cause memory to
malfunction [5], in the very specific sense that social influences
can ‘corrupt’ the representation of what an individual perceived or
thought during some event. With some justification then, research
has focused on the nature of the memory distortions [6] and
patterns of false corroboration [7] that result from conformity to
another person’s memory, as well as factors that promote or
inhibit conformity (e.g. [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]). This research,
however, has consistently revealed patterns of evidence suggesting
that conformity is not dysfunctional. Instead, as noted above,
conformity appears to be a strategic response guided by explicit
mentalizing mechanisms that bias social learning to promote
memory accuracy in the adaptive manner suggested by Frith and
Frith [1] (for similar conclusions see [13] [14]).
Two complementary approaches are typically used to investi-
gate how conformity covaries with the relative accuracy of
memory in self versus other. These approaches either involve
manipulating one’s own memory accuracy, or manipulating what
participants believe about the quality of their partners’ memory.
Using the former approach, studies have found that conformity
increases when the accuracy of one’s own memory decreases, and
vice versa (e.g. [5] [15] [16]). Studies using the latter approach, i.e.
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examining whether conformity is a function of the perceived
accuracy or credibility of a social partner, show that it increases as
the likely accuracy or credibility of one’s partner increases, and
vice versa (e.g. [10] [11] [14] [17]). To bring these two approaches
together, we proposed [3] that memory conformity involves a
strategic trade-off that balances the substantial pros and cons
involved when people learn from one another about the past [18]
[19]. We reported [3] that although individuals did conform more
when shorter encoding durations led their own memory to fail, this
only occurred when individuals believed that the person they were
collaborating with had been able to encode stimuli for a longer
duration. That is, individuals supplemented their own worsening
memory by increasingly relying on their partner’s memory only
when they had reason to trust in the accuracy of their partner’s
memory.
The studies described above show quite clearly that memory
conformity involves the ability to evaluate communications from
others regarding the content of their memory. In particular, to
judge the relative reliability of another person’s memory versus
one’s own memory, individuals appear to use their meta-cognitive
knowledge about factors, such as encoding duration, that
modulate the accuracy of memory. This corresponds precisely to
the regulatory role that Frith and Frith [1] assign to meta-cognitive
mechanisms during social interactions, based on their review of
work on how people judge one another’s perceptual abilities,
cooperative (or deceptive) intent and agency. Studies of memory
conformity are therefore beginning to illuminate how meta-
cognition functions to regulate the accuracy of an individual’s
memory in specific social settings, a key issue highlighted for future
research by Frith and Frith [1].
So far, however, we have considered only how the social
application of meta-cognition may directly benefit individuals by
regulating when and to whom they conform, based on consider-
ations of memory accuracy in self vs. other. But Frith and Frith [1]
also proposed that the ability to keep track of another person’s
beliefs in relation to one’s own has a specific socially beneficial
function. While fully acknowledging its Machiavellian ‘dark side’,
Frith and Frith [1] point out that knowledge of other people’s
inner states can also promote trust and cooperation, which can
produce indirect benefits for individuals themselves. Here, we
hypothesize that a particular explicit mentalizing mechanism may
play a key role in building trust between individuals, and to test
our proposal we examine whether the engagement of this
mechanism leads to significantly enhanced trust in another
person’s memory, even when there is no objective evidence that
their memory accuracy is superior to that of another social
partner. Our hypothesis is that explicit mentalizing builds trust by
helping us to distinguish between like-minded, in-group, versus
dissimilar, out-group, individuals.
Specifically, we propose that simulation-based mentalizing [20]
[21] [22] is a mechanism that allows us to appreciate the degree of
overlap between one’s self and other people. Hence, we predict
that increased belief-simulation during a ‘social inference’ task
should enhance memory conformity to like-minded individuals
who are similar to ones’ self (for a related hypothesis on the effects
of simulating motor-acts in others, see [23]). To test the prediction,
a novel procedure (described below) was developed that integrates
the virtual partner collaborative memory test [3] [8] with the
virtual partner methodology developed by Mitchell and colleagues
to investigate simulation-based mentalizing [20] [21].
First of all, participants were informed that they would get to
know two strangers, based solely on their opinions about various
issues taken from the set constructed by Mitchell, Macrae and
Banaji [20]. Via computer, participants gave their own opinion,
and then they saw the opinions of their two virtual partners. These
were manipulated so that across a total of 20 exposure trials, one
partner agreed 75% of the time with the participant, while the
other partner disagreed 75% of the time. Following this exposure
phase, participants then tried to infer their partners’ opinions on a
further series of novel issues. When this mentalizing phase was
complete, participants next engaged in a collaborative memory
test with their two partners. During this memory phase,
participants viewed images of household scenes, and then
performed the 2-alternative forced-choice memory test [3] [8].
Participants were told that they would view each partner’s
response before making their own, private, response. The partner
responses during the memory test were controlled such that on a
quarter of the trials they both endorsed the correct response
option, and on a quarter of trials they both endorsed the incorrect
response option. On the remaining half of the memory trials, the
partner’s responses disagreed with one another such that on a
quarter of the trials only the similar partner was correct while on
the other quarter only the dissimilar partner was correct. It is
crucial to note that the frequency of correct and incorrect
responses from each partner is therefore identical, and hence any
systematic bias in conformity to one partner over the other cannot
be due to objectively present accuracy differences.
After completing the collaborative memory test, each partici-
pant was finally asked to give their own opinion on those issues
previously encountered during the mentalizing phase. To measure
how the manipulation of agreement during the exposure phase
alters explicit mentalizing, we aligned the participants’ mentalizing
phase responses with their own opinions as expressed in the final
phase of the experiment. The resulting ‘mirror’ score allows us to
quantify belief-simulation and establish whether it is enhanced
towards the more agreeable (i.e. similar) versus less agreeable (i.e.
dissimilar) partner. Our prediction is that using one’s own views to
simulate another person’s – projecting one’s own beliefs onto that
person - will systematically bias to whom we subsequently choose
to conform. As reported below, this was indeed the case.
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
The research was approved by the University of Aberdeen,
School of Psychology Ethics Committee. Informed consent was
obtained in writing from all participants prior to participation, and
all participants were debriefed immediately after participation.
Participants
102 undergraduate psychology students recruited in return for
course credit (48 male, mean age 19.1, SD=2.1) with each person
attending one of four group sessions.
Stimuli
We obtained the full set of opinion statements used by Mitchell
et al. [20], adjusting their wording for the UK context and
rejecting any that could not be so adjusted. Each of the remaining
190 statements was then independently rated, by 24 people, using
a Likert scale. This asked raters to estimate how informative each
statement was about a person’s underlying character. We then
ranked all the statements according to their mean rating. Then we
took the top 30 most informative statements by rank and split these
randomly into 3 sets of ten, equating the mean rating in each set.
These sets were then counterbalanced across participants for
viewing in either the exposure or the mentalizing phases described
below. As filler items, we also used the 10 bottom ranking, i.e. least
informative, opinion statements. To illustrate, the top 3 ranking
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opinion statements were: ‘‘I believe public education is a waste of
time and would enroll my children in private school’’; ‘‘I believe
that eating meat is morally questionable’’; ‘‘I am annoyed by
spending time with people who have different opinions to me’’.
Whereas, the bottom 3 ranking opinion statements were: ‘‘I prefer
red wine to white wine’’; ‘‘I enjoy eating chicken soup’’; ‘‘I enjoy
listening to Radio’’.
For the collaborative memory test we employed the household
scenes first used by Roedier, Meade and Bergman [5] and
subsequently by us [3] [8]. Each participant viewed 3 of these
scenes, and we then tested memory for scene details using 90 2-
alternative forced choice (2AFC) questions, with 30 questions from
each scene. Within these 30 questions we randomly formed four
sets of 7 questions to effect the counterbalancing of four social
information conditions, of which two comprised conflicting
information from each of the virtual partners (similar-accurate/
dissimilar-errant vs. similar-errant/dissimilar-accurate) and two
contained information from each partner that agreed upon a
single response (accurate vs. errant). On the remaining two
questions for each scene we provided no social information at all
purely to enhance the realism of the virtual interaction in order to
mimic trials where the partner’s did not remember any
information or were unable to respond quickly enough within a
trial. To illustrate, participants were asked questions such as: ‘‘Was
the Bathroom window open or closed?’’ (Response alternatives:
‘‘Open’’/‘‘Closed’’); ‘‘What color was the kettle in the Kitchen?’’
(Response alternatives: ‘‘Black’’/‘‘Gray’’); ‘‘What kind of fruit did
you see in the bedroom?’’ (Response alternatives: ‘‘Apple’’/
‘‘Banana’’).
Procedure
The experiment took place in a networked computer lab at
which participants attended in groups of around 24 individuals.
Participants were informed that we were investigating how people
get to know one another based on what beliefs they hold. Then we
informed the participants that they would be paired up randomly
with two other anonymous individuals from their group and that
each triad would interact via computer during the whole
experiment. Participants were informed that to preserve anonym-
ity throughout the experiment, one of their partners would be
labeled as BEAR and the other as TIGER (note that the similar
and dissimilar virtual partners were each given one of these names
equally often across participants).
Exposure phase: participants were informed that the first part of
the experiment involved exposure to their partners opinions about
20 different issues. As noted above, these consisted of a set of 10
highly informative statements along with the 10 filler items. Each
statement was shown on screen, with two response options shown
below (‘‘AGREE’’ or ‘‘DISAGREE’’). The participant was
instructed to give their own response, self-paced, and then the
responses of the two partners were given following a brief
simulated reaction time (using values taken from a distribution
with a mean of 3.0s and an SD of 300ms). This information was
indicated by putting the partners name underneath either the
AGREE or the DISAGREE response, thus signaling whether the
partners agreed or disagreed with the participant’s own response.
The partners’ responses were manipulated so that one partner
agreed on 75% (15/20, of which 10 were highly informative
statements and 5 were fillers) and the other partner disagreed on
75% of trials (15/20,10 highly informative and 5 fillers).
Mentalizing Phase. Immediately after the exposure phase,
participants were told that we would now assess what they had
learned about their partners by asking them to try and predict
their partners’ responses to a new set of opinion statements. We
showed each of these 20 new statements, asking for either BEAR’s
(10 statements) or TIGER’s (10 statements) predicted response.
The order of BEAR/TIGER was randomized from trial to trial.
Memory Phase. Following the mentalizing task, we then
informed the subjects that they and their partners would view a
series of 3 household scenes for 2 minutes each. After this encoding
phase we told the participants that they would now engage in a
collaborative memory task with their partners, and that they would
be able to view their partners’ responses to each 2AFC question
before giving their own private response that would not be
viewable by either of their partners. We also told the participants
that occasionally they might not see any responses if one or other
of the partners did not respond within a 3s interval from the onset
of the 2AFC question. We made the participants explicitly aware
at this point that they were free to use the information from their
partners as they saw fit, and that we would be assessing the
accuracy of their memory as opposed to the overall accuracy of the
triad. These instructions are therefore essentially identical to those
employed in our prior studies using these stimulus materials and
the 2AFC task [3] [8].
Mirror Phase. Finally, after the collaborative memory task
was complete, we asked the participants to give us their own
opinion on the 20 statements shown previously during the




First, we examined the degree to which participants’ own
opinions during the final phase of the procedure mirrored those
given during the mentalizing task that preceded the collaborative
memory test. If responses during the mentalizing task were
essentially random, i.e. they did not systematically derive from the
participant’s own opinions or their opposite, then the mirror scores
should be at chance (i.e. 5 out of 10, given the binary ‘agree’ or
‘disagree’ response option available for each opinion statement).
Against 5 as the null hypothesis value, however, one-sample t-tests
revealed that the similar-partner mirror score of 7.61 (SD=1.69)
was significantly higher than chance (t(101) = 15.65, p,0.0001),
whereas the dissimilar-partner mirror score of 5.08 (SD=2.16) did
not differ from chance (t(101) = 0.37, p= 0.72). Hence, as
predicted, the mirror score was significantly higher for the similar
vs. dissimilar partner (t(101) = 8.94, p,0.0001). These findings
strongly suggest that the similarity manipulation enhanced
simulation-based mentalizing towards the similar partner. Indeed,
we could not find evidence for any simulation of the dissimilar
partner.
Memory Conformity Data
Having established that the similarity manipulation modulated
the extent to which participants simulated their two partners in the
desired direction, we now examine whether simulation biases the
expression of conformity during the memory task. This was
examined by contrasting the participants’ 2AFC response accu-
racy in the conditions where they received conflicting social
information from each partner about the past. If simulation based
mentalizing systematically biases whom we express agreement
with, participants’ should conform more often to the responses of
the more highly simulated partner and less often to the responses
of the other partner. This should cause a pattern of enhanced and
impaired 2AFC responses according to whether the similar
partner’s response was correct or incorrect, respectively. Alterna-
tively, if simulation fails to bias how participants react to social
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information about the past, then we should observe no systematic
difference in 2AFC performance according to the accuracy of the
similar partner. What we observed was that when the similar
partner was correct (and the dissimilar partner was therefore
incorrect), the mean correct 2AFC rate was 76.6% (SD=12.1).
But when the dissimilar partner was correct (and the similar
partner was therefore incorrect) the mean correct 2AFC rate
dropped to 70.1% (13.7). This difference was significant
(t(101) = 3.66, p,0.001). That is, participants did in fact conform
significantly more often to their similar versus dissimilar partner
when faced with conflicting social information about the content of
the scenes they had encoded.
We also examined the difference in correct 2AFC performance
between the conditions where each partners’ responses agreed on
the correct versus incorrect options. When social information
converged on the correct response option, conformity should lead
to an increase in participants’ correct 2AFC performance, as
compared to when the social information converges on the
incorrect response option, and indeed this was the case (correct
social information, 2AFC performance 85.2% (SD=10.5) versus
incorrect social information, 2AFC performance 57.3%
(SD=19.3), t(101) = 12.11, p,0.0001). Performance in these
conditions also indicates that the combined influence of agreement
from both partners over the participant’s responses was much
stronger than that observed in the conflicting social information
conditions. When both partners gave correct information, the
participants mean correct 2AFC rate was significantly higher than
when only the similar partner was correct (85.2% versus 76.6%,
t(101) = 6.14, p,0.001). When both partners gave incorrect
information, the participants mean correct 2AFC rate was
significantly lower than the condition where only the similar
partner was incorrect (57.3% versus 70.1%, t(101) = 7.08,
p,0.001).
Discussion
We quantified the extent to which participants explicitly
simulated their partners’ beliefs based on their own beliefs. We
observed that participants only simulated at levels above chance
when they inferred the beliefs of the partner who had frequently
agreed with their own beliefs during the prior exposure phase. In
marked contrast, we could find no quantifiable evidence for
simulation of the less agreeable, hence more dissimilar, partner. It
is worth while noting that this could have emerged either in the
form of an above or a below chance mirror score for the dissimilar
partner, and that a below chance mirror score would indicate that
the participants employed the opposite of their own opinion [21]
[22]. Instead, however, we observed a mean dissimilar partner
mirror score that did not differ from chance.
Having established that belief-simulation was restricted to the
similar partner, was this difference in mentalizing associated with a
subsequent bias in conformity towards the similar partner’s
memory during the collaborative memory task? The 2AFC results
clearly indicated that this was the case. When faced with different
information from each partner, participants chose the information
provided by their similar partner significantly more often than that
provided by their dissimilar partner. This led to a pattern of
relatively increased 2AFC accuracy when the similar partner
endorsed the correct versus incorrect response option. These
findings suggest that belief-simulation leads to a systematic bias in
memory conformity towards similar and away from dissimilar
individuals, in the absence of any objective evidence that the
simulated individual has a more accurate memory.
Our findings appear to reveal a novel systematic bias in the
expression of memory conformity towards like-minded individuals
and away from individuals who do not share our beliefs. These
new findings follow in a long tradition of work, stretching at least
as far back as the 1950s [24], examining social and interpersonal
influences over individual cognition. More recently, there has been
a surge in research dealing with such influences on memory from a
forensic perspective. This perspective views other people’s
memories as a pernicious corrupting influence that is highly
undesirable. Such influences can distort memory accuracy and
generate spurious patterns of corroboration between individuals
that plague criminal justice systems all over the world. It seems,
however, that the willingness to engage with another person’s
memory may also be interpreted as a highly adaptive reaction to a
rich source of information about the world we and other people
inhabit. Similarly, the benefits of social, or group learning, are also
emphasized in work on the added value of learning with other
people as opposed to on one’s own [25] [26]. The potential
benefits of such social learning do not come without potential
costs, however, and so it is highly likely that evolution will have
selected strategies for social learning that promote its advantages
and offset its costs [1] [19].
Frith and Frith [1] emphasize two kinds of benefit associated
with social learning, from an adaptive perspective. One is
improved accuracy within an individuals’ own mental model of
the world, that may in turn enhance their decision-making
abilities. The second benefit acts indirectly by enhancing mutual
trust and promoting our ability to flexibly cooperate with one
another. To function effectively in both these ways requires us to
apply meta-cognition to other people or, in other words, to
mentalize [1] [27]. In this paper we have focused on the idea that
explicit mentalizing mechanisms play an adaptive role during
social encounters that involve sharing knowledge about the past.
We have argued that substantial support for the adaptive
perspective is already available from studies of memory conformity
originating from the forensic perspective [3]. We briefly reviewed
this evidence in the introduction, which led us to the conclusion
that memory conformity is regulated by insight into factors that
modulate memory accuracy in similar ways in one’s self and other
people. People, quite reasonably, use their own memory function
as a mirror to regulate when and to whom they should conform.
In the new experiment that we report, we examined whether
belief-simulation also functionally biases the social partners that we
choose to conform to. Our findings revealed a pattern consistent
with a link between increased belief simulation and enhanced
conformity. The findings indicate that engaging in belief-
simulation about another individual enhances their relative social
influence over our memory. Hence, projecting our own beliefs
onto others makes us more likely to endorse what such individuals
remember, and less likely to endorse what dissimilar individuals
remember. Our findings therefore compliment recent work from
Echterhoff and colleagues [23] [28] who have examined social
influences over memory as a function of other people’s in-group/
out-group status. Their work has revealed that people are more
willing to adopt and incorporate information about the past from
in-group versus out-group members, where this categorization is
based on easily observable cues such as age, gender or race.
For example, Lindner et al. [23] recently showed that the
increased social influence of in-group members’ memory leads to
increased self versus other confusion over who performed specific
actions. These source-monitoring errors are enhanced when
actions are performed during encoding by an in-group versus
out-group member. Lindner et al proposed (and see [29]) that this
confusion may have resulted from increased motor-simulation
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while viewing acts performed by in-group versus out-group
members, a conclusion they based on findings from social
neuroscience studies of the mirror neuron system [30] [31]. The
present findings compliment this work by showing that engage-
ment of belief-simulation also modulates social influence over
memory.
Our experiment demonstrates a conformity bias that appears to
operate independently of objective differences in the accuracy of a
social partner’s memory. We make this conclusion, while fully
acknowledging that participants could have falsely and systemat-
ically believed that their similar partner had a more accurate
memory than the dissimilar partner. It is not straightforward to
generate an account as to why the mentalizing task would have led
to this mistaken view of the social partners’ memories, but the
available data does not allow us to rule out the possibility. What
seems more likely, however, is that belief-simulation triggered an
enhanced normative social influence [32]. Our present findings
therefore add to studies of such influence, which have found that a
close personal relationship enhances the tendency to conform to
another person [12] [33]. Our findings suggest, however, that it
may be possible to bypass the need to recruit participants who
have complex pre-existing relationships and instead another
person’s social proximity may be controlled and manipulated
using the opinion statements, and the mentalizing task.
It therefore seems reasonable to us that simulation may have
altered our participants’ normative relationship with their
partners, without altering the participant’s views about the likely
accuracy of their partners’ memory. But this claim needs to be
tested in future work and, in closing, we would like to suggest three
possible directions for such studies (we thank an anonymous
reviewer for drawing our attention to these three distinct lines of
work). First, it would seem useful to examine the scope of the
enhancement in trust that simulation generates. It may be that
simulation enhances trust in various contexts, not just those
involving trust in what a partner remembers about the past. For
example, simulation may enhance trust in what a partner has to
say about events in the future. Second, studies are needed to
investigate whether simulation may in fact alter the way that one
evaluates the quality of another person’s knowledge. For example,
are there circumstances where simulation leads one to over-value
information from certain individuals, even if one has reason to
believe that their memory is likely to be poor? Third, the effects of
simulation on normative influence should be explored under
conditions where such influences are heightened. For example, by
employing live interactions between individuals, rather than
virtual partners. A key issue here would be to determine whether
simulation under such conditions tends to enhance conformity, or
if there are circumstances where conformity may be enhanced to
dissimilar partners, for example to offset any negative evaluation of
one’s self by such partners.
Conclusions
We have argued that the adaptive perspective provides a more
fundamental perspective upon the phenomenon of memory
conformity, in comparison to the forensic perspective that has
guided research in recent years. The adaptive perspective
encourages greater attention to the social cognitive mechanisms
that bias when and to whom we conform, complementing the
forensic perspective which is more focused upon the consequences
of conformity for the accuracy and independence of an
individual’s memory. We ran a novel experiment showing, for
the first time to our knowledge, that trust in other people’s
memory is modulated by the extent to which we project our beliefs
onto them, even when there is no objective evidence that
simulated individuals are more accurate than dissimilar individuals
towards whom we do not project our own beliefs. Alongside recent
work originating from the forensic perspective, our new findings
strongly suggest that conformity is not merely a sign of weak or
dysfunctional memory, but is instead an expression of explicit
mentalizing mechanisms that work adaptively to enhance the
accuracy of our mental representations, and our trust in like-
minded individuals with whom we may cooperate for mutual
benefit.
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